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Abstract 
Law frequently demands the production, sometimes effortful, of adequate knowledge for 
decision making. This article explores the challenging epistemic demands made by nature 
conservation law during approval processes for major offshore wind farms. It explores this 
area through the prism of co-production: not only are ‘science’ and ‘facts’ socially and legally 
constructed, but in addition, scientific and factual findings shape society, and law and 
governance. Models are used in planning law to assess whether bird deaths associated with 
a proposed wind farm shall have an adverse effect on the integrity of a protected site. As 
much as providing an accurate factual representation of the impact of a wind farm on 
biodiversity, the models contribute to the very possibility of governing the impact of these 
novel infrastructure developments on biodiversity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Law frequently makes challenging epistemic demands of administrative decision making, 
insisting on the production of adequate knowledge in circumstances where time is short and 
empirical data sparse. Conditions are imposed that can ostensibly be met only by finding 
facts and making predictions, underpinned by sources of legitimacy that are sometimes 
barely available: objective expertise and high quality science. Planning decisions on large 
wind farm projects provide a significant case study of these issues. The ways in which 
knowledge is constructed and asserted in the ‘evidence deficient area’ of offshore wind 
farms’ ornithological impacts,1 is both striking and intriguing. Computer modelling of the 
impact of the wind farms on birds is often central to the legality of a decision, as well as to 
the broader social justification of the decision. Discussion and debate around the models is 
an important feature of the process, as different actors strive to know enough to make lawful 
decisions.  
 
                                                          
* UCL. We would like to thank participants in our February 2017 UCL workshop on modelling for 
renewable energy. We are extremely grateful to Liz Fisher and Andrew Lang for their incisive 
comments on an earlier draft, and to the journal’s referees. This paper was supported by ESRC 
funding (Award number 164522), Evidence, Publics and Decision-Making for Major Wind 
Infrastructure.  
1 Examining Authority Report and Recommendations, Hornsea Project One (2014) (Hornsea One) 
[5.177]. The documents discussed in this article are available at 
<https://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/>.  
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The models routinely used in legal processes are hugely varied, from computer simulations 
of the entire climate system, to less complicated modelling of smaller systems.2 The 
‘Collision Risk Models’ that we focus on here are a relatively simple model that attempts to 
simulate the number of birds that will collide with a proposed wind farm, and reach a 
conclusion on the effect of those deaths on the bird population at a protected habitat.3  
 
Our purpose in this article is not to criticise the use of the models, or to open up the 
particular black boxes being introduced into the decision making process, although these 
could be productive lines of inquiry. Instead, we examine this area through the prism of 
Sheila Jasanoff’s ‘idiom’ of ‘co-production’.4 We outline co-production in the section following 
this introduction, and illustrate it more richly in the detailed examination of our case study, 
taking seriously the proposition that knowledge and society (or facts and law) mutually 
constitute and shape each other, in the process of governing.  
 
Nature conservation legislation requires in principle that a proposed wind farm be denied 
consent unless it can be ‘ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity’ of protected 
sites.5 As discussed further below, this potentially rich notion of ‘integrity’ is reduced rather 
swiftly (we are not suggesting improperly) to separate discrete nature conservation issues, 
such as the disturbance of particular species of fish or sea mammals during construction or 
operation. Of these issues, the implications of the collision of protected birds with the 
proposed wind farm are especially instructive for current purposes, and a prominent feature 
of the decisions. An abstract legal or purely semantic definition of ‘integrity’, suitable for 
simple application to pre-determined facts in any case, is difficult to imagine. But 
straightforward pre-determined facts are just as difficult to imagine. The meaning of the legal 
requirement is not independent of the ‘facts’ as established through the models, but nor are 
the models or their outputs independent of the way we regulate. This sort of co-production 
could be tracked through a great deal of administrative law making.6 The especially dense 
                                                          
2 N. Oreskes, ‘The Role of Quantitative Models in Science’ in Models in Ecosystem Science, eds. 
C.D. Canham et al. (2003); D.A. Farber, ‘Modelling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy and 
Science’ (2008) 86 Texas Law Rev. 1655; W. Wagner et al., ‘Misunderstanding Models in 
Environmental and Public Health Regulation’ (2010) 18 NYU Environmental Law J. 293.  
3 See B. Band, Using a Collision Risk Model to Assess Bird Collision Risks for Offshore Windfarms 
(2012).  
4 As an ‘idiom’ co-production is not a ‘fully fledged theory’, but ‘a way of interpreting and accounting 
for complex phenomena’, S. Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co-production in States of Knowledge: The Co-
Production of Science and Social Order ed. S. Jasanoff (2004) 3. 
5 Directive 1992/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora [1992] OJ L 
206/7.  
6 See also E. Fisher, ‘Expert Executive Power, Administrative Constitutionalism and Co-production: 
Why they Matter’ in Regulating Risks in the EU: The Co-Production of Expert and Executive Power, 
eds. M. Weimer and A. de Ruijter (2017).  
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nature of co-production in our area illuminates the difficulty of identifying precisely and 
predictably where authority lies in the decision making process: legal, scientific and political 
authority are mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing.  
 
Even at the end of the decision making process, uncertainty surrounds the impact of 
offshore wind farms on ecosystems and biodiversity, specifically on birds.7 If collision risk 
models do not provide a prediction of bird deaths, still less an accurate factual 
representation of the integrity of a site, we need to think carefully about the work they are 
doing in legal reasoning. In part, this is precisely about co-production: law requires us to 
‘know’, and so the models contribute to the very possibility of legitimate governance. Rather 
than thinking in terms of the failure of models to reflect the ‘truth’, we might consider them in 
terms of constructing and applying what Jasanoff calls ‘serviceable truth’,8 a ‘good enough’ 
approximation of the truth. A related but distinct approach, drawing on Andrew Lang’s 
discussion of ‘as if’ modes of reasoning, would see the models not in terms of representation 
of truth at all, but precisely about allowing us to act, to govern, in a particular field.9 It is 
plausible that elements of both of these features of reasoning appear in the approach to the 
impact of offshore wind farms on birds in our cases. Whatever their relationship with ‘truth’, 
approximating it or ‘wilfully [abandoning]’ it,10 the models make an important contribution to 
the aspiration to legitimate and acceptable governance. We argue that the models are not 
solely or primarily about facts, but about the process of decision making. Their iteration 
within the planning process provides a space for the inclusion of various actors in the 
negotiation of an understanding of the legality of a proposed wind farm.  
 
After this introduction, we first outline and contextualise ‘co-production’, before briefly 
introducing the legal framework, and our ‘cases’. Decisions on large offshore wind farms are 
made under the Planning Act 2008, which sets up a special regime for ‘nationally significant 
infrastructure projects’ (NSIPs).11 The decisions must also comply with rules set out in nature 
                                                          
7 We recognise that ‘uncertainty’ is a complex notion that should be used carefully, but we shall not 
expressly pursue that in this article (although it is implicit in our discussion). On sources of uncertainty 
in modelling, see e.g. D. Owen and J. Fine, ‘Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models 
and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning’ (2005) Hastings Law J. 901; E Fisher et al., 
‘Understanding Environmental Models in their Legal and Regulatory Context’ (2010) 22 J. of 
Environmental Law 251.  
8 S. Jasanoff ‘Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy’ (2015) 93 Texas Law Rev. 
1723.  
9 A. Lang, ‘Governing “As If”: Global Subsidies Regulation and the Benchmark Problem’ (2014) 67 
Current Legal Problems 135.  
10 K. Knop et al., ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture and the Conflict of Laws 
Style’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law Rev. 589.   
11 Discussed in more detail in M. Lee et al., ‘Public Participation and Climate Change Infrastructure’ 
(2013) 25 J. of Environmental Law 33. 
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conservation legislation. We use a small number of reports, issued on applications for a 
Development Consent Order (DCO) under the Planning Act 2008, to explore the ways in 
which knowledge of bird deaths is constructed to comply with nature conservation 
legislation. Core terms, for our purposes specifically ‘integrity’, are very open: not simply 
legally ambiguous, but only capable of being described through their application to a 
particular problem, within the decision making process. We do not claim that this is an 
extraordinary feature of nature conservation law. But it is rarely dwelled on by lawyers, and 
makes an interesting context for considering the construction of ‘integrity’ in our cases, the 
subject of the following section. We then turn more explicitly to co-production, examining the 
ways in which the courts understand the decision on integrity as containing elements of fact, 
law and judgment, and the ways in which the fuzzy nature of the decision makes for a 
blurring of authority among those responsible. Finally, we reflect on the significance of 
pervasive uncertainty in an area of law that strongly insists on clear knowledge. We argue 
that collision risk modelling can usefully be examined as part of the process of decision 
making, rather than as a technical way to provide decisive facts for the decision maker to 
use.  
 
This article is on the one hand narrow: the role of particular models, to resolve a particular 
legal question, in a particular planning process, for a particular type of infrastructure 
development. Our exploration of the detail of our case study is however suggestive of the 
complexity and contingency of decision making and the use of evidence in large 
infrastructure planning, and contributes to the understanding of EU and English nature 
conservation law. Moreover, the issues in this article are not limited to wind farms, nature 
conservation, or even the use of models specifically. Law often requires the production of 
adequate knowledge, and the development of cognitive techniques is a necessary 
component of governance.12 And often, as here, these epistemic demands are made in the 
context of limited empirical evidence, as well as challenges around monitoring and correcting 
data.13 Understanding the work being done with and by different cognitive techniques and 
pieces of evidence in these circumstances, is, we argue, crucial to understanding legal 
reasoning and legitimate decision making. Although modelling is increasingly important to 
                                                          
12 E.g. A. Lang, ‘The Legal Construction of Economic Rationalities’ (2013) 40 Journal of Law and 
Society 155. The legislative neglect of under-researched species / habitats by legislation, and 
conversely, the knowledge stimulated by regulation is often noted: S. Bryan, ‘Contested Boundaries, 
Contested Places: The Natura 2000 Network in Ireland’ (2012) 28 J. of Rural Studies 80; C. Rodgers, 
The Law of Nature Conservation (2013).  
13 A.S.C.P. Cook et al., ‘The Avoidance Rate of Collision between Birds and Offshore Turbine’ (2014) 
5 Scottish Marine and Freshwater Science <http://data.marine.gov.scot/dataset/avoidance-rates-
collision-between-birds-and-offshore-turbines>. 
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law,14 and both co-production and uncertainty absolutely pervasive, the themes we develop 
in this article are relatively little examined in their detailed legal or regulatory context.15  
 
CO-PRODUCTION 
 
Jasanoff’s ‘idiom’ of co-production is a rich and flexible16 approach to science / society 
relations, building on decades of work in science and technology studies.17 We do not think it 
would be helpful (or even honest) to attempt to create a tidy picture of the way in which co-
production fits into a vast and unruly (‘for good reason’18) broader literature on these issues. 
Consistently with other strands of science and technology studies,19 co-production 
challenges and complicates well-used categories (such as fact and value, science and 
society, knowledge and political power), and the bright lines between those categories. 
Beyond science and technology studies, we might refer to the literature on knowledge 
production,20 or on the role of knowledge, science or experts within policy making,21 as well 
as the legal literature on expertise in regulatory decision making;22 Susan Owens draws 
attention to the common ground between co-production and the exploration of ‘policy 
learning’ in political science;23 David Kennedy traces co-production specifically to actor-
network theory in science and technology studies.24 Each of these bodies of work contains 
strands that recognise and engage with the complex interactions and relationships between 
science and society, in sophisticated ways. We might also note that the term ‘co-production’, 
literally making something together, has been used in other contexts. Co-production of 
knowledge is sometimes used simply to mean collaboration between different actors 
(scientists from different disciplines, policy makers, lay communities) to agree on certain 
factual propositions together. Elinor Ostrom’s work on the co-production of public services is 
                                                          
14 Fisher et al., op. cit., n. 7. There is a larger US legal literature.  
15 Much of the literature focuses on knowledge and policy making, rather than the detailed, repeated 
regulatory decisions explored here.  
16 She explicitly does not expect everyone to invoke it in the same way, ‘Afterword’ in op. cit., n. 4, p. 
275.  
17 S. Jasanoff, ‘Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society’ in op. cit., n. 4, reviews the literature working 
in the idiom of co-production. 
18 S. Owens, Knowledge, Policy and Expertise: The UK Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution 1970-2011 (2015) 6.  
19 Generally e.g. J. Hackett et al. (eds.), The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (2008); A. 
Irwin, ‘STS Perspectives on Scientific Governance’ in id. 
20 E.g. M.Gibbons et al, The Production of New Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research 
in Contemporary Societies (1994) 
21 E.g. Owens, op. cit., n. 18; H. Collins and R. Evans, Rethinking Expertise (2009); R.A. Pielke Jr., 
The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics (2007).  
22 Within which this paper sits, see the work cited herein.  
23 Op. cit., n. 18, pp. 9-13.  
24 D. Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy 
(2016), 282. 
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based on the simple but profound idea that the production as well as the consumption of 
public services can require citizen participation.25 
 
Two related features of Jasanoff’s framework of co-production are important for current 
purposes. First, Jasanoff questions the separate existence, as ‘discrete and distinctive 
spheres’,26 of the categories we use to think about science and society (including ‘science’ 
and ‘society’), bringing ‘knowledge practices and power practices into the same frame’.27 
Most pertinently for this article, co-production responds to the possible asymmetry of familiar 
approaches to the social construction of science.28 Social constructionism stresses the social 
context and commitments of science, and rejects the autonomy of science and knowledge 
from society. But just as ‘the facts’ cannot be taken for granted, as something that exist 
independently of society, ‘out there’ and waiting to be discovered, nor can ‘the social’. Not 
only are ‘science’ and ‘facts’ socially constructed, but ‘the social’ is also partially constructed 
by what and how we know about the world. Nor can ‘aspects of the social’,29 such as 
interests or gender, be taken for granted, or assumed to be unproblematic. Law and 
governance may be understood here as an aspect of the social. Law is not ‘a datum, a fact, 
unproblematic and one-dimensional’,30 and it too contributes to the shaping of knowledge, 
which in turn shapes law, until in some cases facts and law are barely distinguishable. 
Questions of authority and questions of knowledge are irredeemably intertwined in our case 
study: ‘my ideas legitimate your power, your power enforces my ideas’.31 
 
This article focuses on the mutual shaping of law and facts within a particular set of 
development control processes. We argue that the ‘facts’ and the methodologies by which 
they are known, are partially legally constructed (shaped by the law), and that 
simultaneously the meaning and demands of the law are shaped by the facts as found, and 
the methods available to construct those facts. We resist the temptation to prioritise either 
the legal or the factual, or to see either as unproblematically existing and waiting to be 
discovered. We argue that in the process of governing, knowledge of the world is demanded: 
this knowledge is shaped by the body of law for whose purposes it is generated; and the 
                                                          
25 See e.g. E. Ostrom, ‘The Comparative Study of Public Economies’ (1998) 42 The American 
Economist 3; J. Alford, ‘The Multiple Facets of Co-Production: Building on the Work of Elinor Ostrom’ 
(2014) 16 Public Management Review 299.  
26 Owens, op. cit., n. 18, p. 13.  
27 Kennedy, op. cit., n. 24, p. 4.  
28 Jasanoff, op. cit., n. 17, p. 19; Irwin, op. cit., n. 19.  
29 Jasanoff, id., p. 20.  
30 C. McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Rev. 632, at 
648.  
31 Kennedy, op, cit., n 24, p. 8; Weimer and de Reuijter, op. cit., n. 6.  
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output and the process of creation of the knowledge, simultaneously shapes the meaning 
and development of that body of law.  
 
In co-production, Jasanoff’s facts often take on significance beyond their own regulatory 
context, world-making more widely. The tight bond between knowledge-making and 
authority-making, facts and governance, which we explore here, is one significant element of 
Jasanoff’s ‘complex exercise in world-making’,32 which can be explored at different scales.33 
The consequences and stability of the planning world’s understanding of the impact of wind 
farms on birds in the wider world are still to be seen, and examining that would be a different 
project from the current one. But by ensuring the authority to decide, the co-productive 
exercise in our cases ultimately contributes to the physical reality of large, innovative 
infrastructure, and to an understanding of that infrastructure as governable, knowable and 
controllable, even benign.  
 
THE LEGAL AND DECISION FRAMEWORK 
 
Frustration with processes for major infrastructure planning, which had been perceived by 
some to be slow and inefficient, led to the introduction of a new planning system by the 
Planning Act 2008.34 ‘Nationally significant infrastructure projects’ (NSIPs), a category of 
development that includes offshore generating stations over 100Mw, are not subject to Local 
Planning Authority decision making, or to the public inquiry system that dominated large 
infrastructure planning before 2008. An application for a Development Consent Order (DCO) 
is made to an Examining Authority (ExA), appointed by the Planning Inspectorate, which 
makes recommendations and reports its ‘findings and conclusions’ to the Secretary of 
State.35 Although not binding, it is rare for the Secretary of State to disagree with the ExA’s 
recommendations. ExA Reports have significant authority within the system, and their 
reasoning and explanations are crucial in understanding and justifying the decision.  
 
Decisions have to comply with EU nature conservation law, which means that bird mortality 
feeds directly into the lawfulness of any decision. Unusually, nature conservation law 
imposes substantive, as well as procedural, obligations to protect what in English law are 
called ‘European sites’ (and ‘European marine sites’). ‘European sites’ include areas 
                                                          
32 S. Jasanoff, ‘Constitutions of Modernity: Science, Risk and Governable Subjects’ in Weimer and de 
Ruijter op. cit., n. 6, p. 22, of risk regulation specifically. 
33 Jasanoff, op. cit., n. 4, p. 5. 
34 Lee et. al., op. cit. n.11. 
35 Planning Act 2008, s 74.  
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designated under either the EU Habitats Directive36 (Special Areas of Conservation, SACs) 
or the earlier Birds Directive37 (Special Protection Areas, SPAs).38 The Directives have been 
transposed into the law of England and Wales by the Habitats Regulations 2010.39 There are 
two key questions. First, is a project ‘likely to have a significant effect’ on a European site? If 
so, it must be subject to an ‘appropriate assessment’ (which the ExA Reports generally refer 
to as a ‘Habitats Regulations Assessment’, HRA) ‘of its implications for the site in view of the 
site’s conservation objectives’. Secondly, if an HRA was necessary, has it ‘ascertained that 
[the project] will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned’?40 If not, then unless 
demanding conditions are met, the project cannot go ahead.41  
 
As well as being responsible for the final decision on the DCO as a whole, the Secretary of 
State is the ‘competent authority’ under EU nature conservation legislation, with 
responsibility for the final decision on integrity. The applicant ‘must provide such information 
as the competent authority reasonably require’ for the process.42 The competent authority 
‘must … consult the appropriate nature conservation body and have regard to any 
representations made by the body’.43 The nature conservation body also advises the ExA, 
for the purposes of its recommendations to the Secretary of State. The ‘appropriate nature 
conservation body’ is Natural England or Natural Resources Wales; because the offshore 
wind farms discussed here are English, for simplicity, we refer generically in this article to 
Natural England.44  
 
Ornithological issues, and the development of techniques by which they might be 
understood, are not limited to European sites, but also arise with respect to national 
                                                          
36 Op. cit. n. 5. 
37 Directive 2009/147 on the conservation of wild birds (codified version) [2010] OJ L 20/7 (Birds 
Directive). 
38 Sites at different stages in the designation process are treated as if they are European sites, as are 
internationally protected sites, see Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010, SI 
2010/490 (Habitats Regulations) and National Planning Policy Framework (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2012) 28.  
39 Id., and (beyond the 12 nautical mile limit) the Offshore Marine Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c) 
Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1842, both as amended.  
40 Op. cit. n. 5, art 6. SPAs are subject to art 6, see Habitats Directive art 7.  
41 The project can be consented if it must go ahead for ‘for imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest’, and there are no alternative solutions, and appropriate ‘compensatory measures’ are taken; 
in the case of ‘priority’ habitats and species, either the imperative reasons are limited to human 
health, public safety and the environment, or the opinion of the Commission must be sought. Perhaps 
surprisingly, consideration of the exceptions has not been necessary in the cases discussed here. 
Their application is fascinating, see e.g. ExA Report and Recommendations, Able Marine Park 
(2013).  
42 Reg 61(2). 
43 Reg 61(3). 
44 The Joint Nature Conservation Council advises on UK-wide and international nature conservation. 
It takes primary responsibility for European sites in offshore waters; the protected sites in our 
discussion are all onshore breeding sites, although the wind farms themselves are out to sea.  
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designations, and non-designated sites and species. We are focusing on European sites 
because of the high level of substantive (rather than just procedural) protection provided by 
the EU legislation.45 The formulation of the legislation (consent can only be granted ‘having 
ascertained that [the project] will not adversely affect the integrity’ of the site) effectively 
means that it is not for the regulator to prove adverse effects, but for the applicant to 
convince the regulator that there are no such adverse effects.46 If the decision maker is 
‘unconvinced’, it ‘may – indeed must – refuse to make a DCO, irrespective of the cause of 
that deficiency’.47 This concern of the applicant to counter all challenges and queries makes 
the role of evidence, and of debate and disagreement over evidence, especially visible.  
 
All of the ExA reports on nationally significant wind farms contain rich discussions of 
ornithological issues. In this article, we focus in particular on the Rampion Offshore Wind 
Farm,48 and Hornsea Project Two,49 which raise some of the recurring issues around 
ornithological impact. Rampion was granted a DCO in April 2014 for up to 175 wind turbines, 
with a total generating capacity of up to 700 Mw, 13-25 kilometres off the Sussex coast. The 
applicant assessed the likelihood of significant effects for a number of European sites. 
Following multiple iterations of evidence, frequently prompted by Natural England, the 
applicant concluded that the project was not likely to have significant effects on any 
European site. However, Natural England insisted that when considered in combination with 
other wind farms, the proposal was likely to have significant effects on the Flamborough 
Head and Bempton Cliffs (FHBC) SPA. The ExA ‘accepts and gives weight’ to Natural 
England’s advice, and so an HRA was carried out.50 Ultimately, and again after a number of 
iterations of the models, the ExA concluded that there would be no adverse effect on the 
integrity of the FHBC SPA. Hornsea Two will be the second development within the 
‘Hornsea zone’. The application was for up to two offshore wind farms, with up to 360 
generators and a total capacity of up to 1800 Mw, situated in the North Sea, 89 kilometres 
from the English coast. The applicant ultimately agreed that the development was likely to 
                                                          
45 All law deriving from EU law, including the Habitats Regulations, is expected to survive the UK 
leaving the EU, including relevant decisions handed down by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), see European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, clauses 2-6. In any event, the underlying issues 
discussed in this article apply also in domestic nature conservation law, and hold lessons for the 
relationship between law, knowledge and decision making. And EU legislation continues to apply in 
the other 27 Member States of the EU. 
46 Case C-127/02 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee v. Staatssecretaris van 
Landbouw [2005] 2 C.M.L.R 31, Opinion of AG Kokott, [99].  
47 R (on the application of Mynyyd y Gwynt Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy [2017] Env. L.R. 14. This is a judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to 
grant a DCO for the Mynyyd y Gwynt onshore wind farm, due to the impact on birds (and hence on 
the integrity of a European site).  
48 ExA Report and Recommendations, Rampion Offshore Wind Farm (2014).  
49 ExA Report and Recommendations, Hornsea Project Two (2016). 
50 Id. [5.65].  
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have a significant effect on eleven European sites,51 and so carried out an HRA for each of 
those sites. Natural England and the RSPB disagreed with the applicant’s conclusion on 
integrity, on a number of grounds.52 The negotiation of mitigation between Natural England 
and the applicant included changes to the design of the wind turbines and a reduction in the 
number of turbines to three hundred.53 Natural England concluded that there would be no 
adverse effect on integrity.54 The RSPB continued to argue that there would be an adverse 
effect on the integrity of the FHBC SPA.55 The ExA expressed ‘concern’ that ‘some parties 
are being over-precautionary’,56 concluding, ‘on the basis of its Examination and objective 
scientific evidence, and the summary advice of [Natural England]’, that there would be no 
adverse effect on integrity.57  
 
The decision documents (especially the ExA Report and the Secretary of State letter) for 
Rampion and Hornsea Two are our primary source for this article. We shall also refer 
occasionally to other applications, especially the Navitus Bay Offshore Wind Farm,58 an 
application that was unsuccessful, largely on landscape grounds,59 and Hornsea Project One 
(where the discussion of ornithological issues is strikingly similar to Hornsea Two).60 We are 
interested in ‘integrity’, and specifically the assessment of bird mortality, which is often ‘a 
central theme’ of the HRA.61 That is far from exhausting even the ornithological issues in the 
reports, or the issues arising in European sites, let alone broader nature conservation 
issues. But this focus allows careful reflection on the relationship between law and 
knowledge in this highly uncertain area.  
 
CONSTRUCTING ‘INTEGRITY’ 
 
As outlined above, any project ‘likely to have a significant effect’ on a European site must be 
subject to an HRA; and consent can only be granted, subject to stringent exceptions, having 
ascertained that the project will not have an adverse effect on the integrity of the protected 
site. Whether an assessment is necessary, and what it means to ascertain that there are no 
adverse effects on integrity, have both been interpreted by the CJEU in a precautionary 
                                                          
51 Secretary of State decision letter [4.24].  
52 [6.7.43]. Note also the discussion of the inclusion of the displacement figures in the assessment.  
53 [6.7.29]-[6.7.30]. 
54 [6.7.41], [6.7.45], [6.7.46].  
55 Summarised at [6.7.47].  
56 [6.7.48]. 
57 [6.7.49], on kittiwake specifically.  
58 ExA Report and Recommendations, Navitus Bay Wind Park (2015). 
59 M. Lee, ‘Landscape and Knowledge in Nationally Significant Wind Energy Projects’ (2017) 37 Legal 
Studies 3.  
60 Op. cit. n. 1.  
61 Hornsea One [5.25]. 
 11 
 
manner, particularly in the well-known Waddenzee (Cockle Fishers) decision.62 ‘Likely’ to 
have a significant impact, in this EU context, does not imply the high level of probability that 
we would expect in English law.63 A project is ‘likely’ to have a significant effect, ‘if it cannot 
be excluded, on the basis of objective information, that the project will have a significant 
effect on that site’.64 The low threshold for the obligation to carry out an assessment has 
been emphasised by the Court of Justice and the national courts.65 The assessment must 
identify impacts affecting the site's conservation objectives ‘in the light of the best scientific 
knowledge in the field’.66 The project can be authorised only if the decision maker has ‘made 
certain’ that there will be no adverse effect on integrity, which means that ‘no reasonable 
scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects’.67 We might ask whether the 
language in Waddenzee really takes the impossibility of certainty seriously. The ExAs are 
evidently cautious about ensuring the lawfulness of their decisions under Waddenzee, but 
they are not paralysed by the CJEU’s demanding approach, and take a pragmatic approach 
to looking for a ‘real (rather than hypothetical) risk’,68 language taken from another line of EU 
cases on the precautionary principle.69 And even in Waddenzee, Advocate General Kokott 
describes the assessment as ‘of necessity, subjective in nature’, in the sense that the 
decision makers can ‘from their point of view, be certain there will be no adverse effects 
even though, from an objective point of view, there is no absolute certainty’.70  
 
‘Integrity’ is a legal term, with a legal meaning in the hands of the CJEU. According to 
Advocate General Sharpston in Sweetman, integrity means ‘the continued wholeness and 
soundness of the constitutive characteristics of the site concerned’.71 It is difficult to imagine 
a judicial or legislative definition wholly determining the way integrity works in every case, 
rather than being part of a process of interpretation and application by scientists, alongside 
the legal and policy community.72 Although it is dealing with a different part of the Habitats 
Directive (‘deliberate disturbance’ rather than ‘integrity’), the Supreme Court decision in 
                                                          
62 Waddenzee op. cit. n. 4646.  
63 On the different language versions, not all of which include the degree of probability inherent in 
‘likely’, see Waddenzee, id. Opinion of AG Kokott, [69] and Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:743 Opinion of AG Sharpston, [46].  
64 Waddenzee, id. [45] (Court).  
65 Sweetman, op. cit., n. 63, Opinion of AG Sharpston [49]; R (on the application of Champion) v. 
North Norfolk DC [2015] UKSC 52; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3710 [12].  
66 Waddenzee, op. cit., n. 46, [61] (Court).  
67 Id., [61].  
68 Mynydd y Gwynt, op. cit., n. 47, [20(iii)].  
69 The line of cases emerging from Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] E.C.R. II-
3305 addresses risk regulation.  
70 Op. cit., n.46, [107].  
71 Sweetman, op. cit., n. 63, [54].  
72 See Y. Epstein, ‘Favourable Conservation Status for Species: Examining the Habitats Directive’s 
Key Concept through a Case Study of the Swedish Wolf’ (2016) 28 J. of Environmental Law 221.  
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Morge is revealing.73 The Court says it would be ‘unrealistic’74 to aspire to more than ‘broad 
considerations’75 of legal interpretation. This case has been interpreted as prioritising 
scientific over legal judgment: ‘no amount of judicial thinking can assist’, and instead we 
must turn to ‘scientific opinion’.76  
 
Even if the Supreme Court in Morge could have provided further, helpful legal definition,77 
and more might reasonably be said about the legal content of ‘integrity’, semantic refinement 
of ‘integrity’ cannot provide something entirely prior to and independent of the factual context 
to which it applies. Advocate General Sharpston’s further legal guidance on ‘integrity’ 
clarifies the boundaries that are imposed by law. Because the legislation requires the 
assessment to be carried out ‘in view of the site's conservation objectives’, so ‘the 
constitutive characteristics of the site that will be relevant are those in respect of which the 
site was designated and their associated conservation objectives.’78 A site’s ‘conservation 
objectives’ should be set out at the time of designation of an SPA or SAC, a process with an 
important role for Natural England. The conservation objectives of the FHBC SPA, as set out 
and discussed in both Rampion and Hornsea Two, are worth quoting:  
 'Avoid the deterioration of the habitats of the qualifying features, and the significant 
disturbance of the qualifying features, ensuring the integrity of the site is maintained and the 
site makes a full contribution to achieving the aims of the Birds Directive.  
 Subject to natural change, to maintain or restore: 
- The extent and distribution of habitats of the qualifying features; 
- The structure and function of the habitats of qualifying features; 
- The supporting processes on which the habitats of the qualifying features rely; 
- The distribution of the qualifying features within the site.’79 
 
The circularity of the definition of ‘integrity’ (integrity is defined in part by reference to 
conservation objectives, which are defined in part by reference to integrity), emphasises the 
difficulty of seeing this as a simply factual or a simply legal question.80 The conservation 
objectives constitute what we have elsewhere termed ‘prior institutional knowledge’, by 
which we mean knowledge that has been absorbed within the system in an earlier process, 
                                                          
73 R (Morge) v. Hampshire County Council [2011] W.L.R. 268.  
74 Id. [25].  
75 Id. [79] (Lord Kerr, dissenting, but not on this issue).  
76 L. Warren, ‘Bats or Buses: A Battle for a Beeching Cast-off – R (on the application of Morge) v 
Hampshire CC’ [2011] Environmental Law Rev. 205, 213. See also C. George and D. Graham, ‘After 
Morge, Where Are We Now? The Meaning of “Disturbance” in the Habitats Directive’ in The Habitats 
Directive: A Developer's Obstacle Course?, ed. G. Jones (2012) 58. 
77 George and Graham id.  
78 Sweetman, op. cit., n. 63, [56]. See also on the importance of the conservation objectives European 
Commission, Assessment of plans and projects significantly affecting Natura 2000 sites 
Methodological guidance on the provisions of Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC 
(2001).  
79 Rampion [5.69]. Note that these were updated in 2014, see Hornsea Two [6.7.3].  
80 See also RSPB v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2015] Env. L.R. 
24 (CA) on the interpretation of conservation objectives, [21].  
 13 
 
and need not be reopened.81 For current purposes, the conservation objectives provide prior 
institutional knowledge on the site’s nature conservation interest. Prior institutional 
knowledge routinely provides stability within legal reasoning. It both simplifies and enriches 
the factual and legal context for a decision; in this case simplifying by sidestepping a lot of 
complicated discussion about what constitutes integrity, and enriching by being wholly 
specific to the idiosyncracies of a particular site.  
 
Most importantly, the conservation objectives confirm the centrality of birds to assessing the 
‘integrity’ of the FHBC SPA: the ‘qualifying features’ referenced in the quotation above are 
kittiwake and gannet.82 Whilst other ornithological (for example bird displacement) and 
biodiversity (for example the effect on marine mammals) issues are addressed in the 
examinations and the reports, the ExA reports demonstrate very little curiosity about any 
possibly more expansive or profound meaning to ‘integrity’. We concentrate on the 
discussion of bird deaths by collision, as illustrating clearly the issues we discuss in this 
article, and as the ‘most debated’ ornithological issue in our cases.83  
 
The National Policy Statement on Renewable Energy explicitly provides that collision risk 
modelling ‘may be appropriate’ for assessing the impact of a wind farm on birds.84 This sort 
of ‘official’ approval is always important to the ExA.85 The ‘Band’ model is the ‘current 
methodological standard for [collision risk modelling]’,86 and there can be lengthy 
discussions of the most appropriate ‘version’ of Band.87 It is worth noting that the Band 
model was created for the Crown Estate, and so explicitly for the purposes of governing.88 
To describe the approach as highly specialist and technical is an understatement.  
 
There are several steps to the assessment of the impact of the applicant’s proposal on birds. 
We draw this somewhat simplified description of the modelling from the reports, and from 
Band. An initial requirement is to identify the excess deaths from the wind farm that the 
relevant population of birds (and so the protected site) can tolerate: ‘Potential Biological 
Removal’ (PBR) modelling and ‘Population Viability Analysis’ (PVA) are two methods used in 
                                                          
81 Lee, op. cit., n. 59. 
82 [5.70]. The seabird assemblage was also a qualifying feature, [5.71]. 
83 The quotation is from Hornsea Two, [6.7.42], but it is a fair analysis of the other reports.  
84 DECC, National Policy Statement on Renewable Energy Infrastructures (EN-3) (2011) [26.104].  
85 See e.g. on landscape, Lee, op. cit., n. 59.  
86 Hornsea Two [6.7.12]. Band, op. cit., n. 3, which makes the extent of uncertainty and simplification 
very clear.  
87 See the discussion of the different approaches in Hornsea Two, [6.7.12]-[6.7.15]. The four options 
vary according to assumptions about bird flight data, and the availability of site specific information.  
88 Simplifying, the Crown Estate leases wind farm capacity at sea.  
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our cases.89 PVA calculations ‘use simulation modelling of population processes and 
population size’,90 often to estimate ‘the probability that a population … will persist for some 
particular time in a particular environment’.91 In our cases, estimates of what would happen 
to the population without the wind farm, including expected population growth, contribute to 
the assessment of the wind farm’s impact. PBR modelling is designed ‘to determine levels of 
incidental mortality that will not lead to population decline, setting upper and lower thresholds 
for mortality through use of different population recovery factors.’92 It defines ‘headroom’, 
that is ‘the additional mortality margin forecast as possible without affecting integrity.’93 
Sometimes this whole process is called ‘collision risk modelling’, but that phrase also applies 
to the next step in the process, which calculates the number of birds that will collide with the 
wind farm per month or year.94 This is then assessed against the mortality that the relevant 
population can tolerate, according to PBR modelling or PVA. Surveys of birds at protected 
sites gather initial evidence to feed into the PBR or PVA, and surveys of the proposed 
development site gather ‘flight data’, on the number of birds at the site and the proportion 
that fly through the site at rotor height.95  
 
It swiftly becomes apparent on reading the ExA reports that each step of this process can be 
subject to contestation and discussion, and that negotiation between the applicant and 
statutory bodies (and occasionally others) are, as discussed below, crucial to streamlining 
areas for discussion. The applicant in Hornsea Two had used PBR, but Natural England and 
the RSPB ‘advocated the use of PVA’; as a result of these discussions, the applicant also 
produced a PVA report.96 Disagreement remained over whether the applicant’s data on the 
relevant bird population was sufficiently robust to use the version of PVA that it did;97 the 
applicant and Natural England agreed a methodology, with a range between an upper 
threshold and a lower threshold of bird deaths that would not adversely affect conservation 
status.98 The accuracy of the applicant’s boat based observations of the height at which 
birds fly through the project site, and their extrapolation into the model, were also contested 
                                                          
89 A Biologically Defined Minimum Population Scale (BDMPS) is discussed in some reports (e.g. 
Hornsea Two, Navitus). This assesses populations during the non-breeding season, rather than 
counting breeding pairs, R.W. Furness, ‘Non-Breeding Season Populations of Seabirds in UK Waters: 
Population Sizes for BDMPS’ (2015) Natural England Commissioned Reports No 164.  
90 Hornsea One [6.7.23]. 
91 L. Gerber and M. Gonzalex-Suarez, ‘Population Viability Analysis: Origins and Contributions’ (2010) 
3 Nature Education Knowledge 15.  
92 Rampion [4.220].  
93 [5.80]. 
94 Band, op. cit., n. 3. 
95 Band, id. 
96 [6.7.24].  
97 Hornsea Two [6.7.25]. 
98 [5.79]. 
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in Hornsea Two, by both Natural England and the RSPB.99 The applicant ran multiple 
versions of the model. Again, Natural England and the applicant were able to agree a 
Statement of Common Ground on the outputs of the final model.100  
 
A central and contested assumption within the final step of collision risk modelling ‘proper’ is 
the ‘avoidance rate’ (AR). This describes the proportion of birds currently using the relevant 
area which are expected to avoid colliding with the turbines. Band says that ‘for the 
foreseeable future, it seems likely that the uncertainties surrounding bird avoidance 
behaviour are likely to dwarf the other errors and uncertainties arising from an inexact 
collision model or variability in survey data’.101 Altering this parameter can however directly 
affect the outcome.102 In Rampion, Natural England preferred a 98% AR for gannet, the 
applicant a 99% AR. The mortality by collision rate is halved by a 99% AR, from a predicted 
annual gannet mortality of fourteen birds to seven.103 These are low numbers, but even so, 
depending on the way in which the impacts of other wind farm projects are taken into 
account, can make the difference between exceeding the ‘headroom’ or not. The ExA 
emphasises that 98% ‘would include a precautionary element’, but that ‘insufficient 
convincing evidence was presented … to demonstrate that a 98% avoidance rate is so 
exceedingly precautionary as to be unrealistic.’104 So the ExA prefers Natural England’s 
98%,105 but explicitly ‘recognises it will be for the [Secretary of State] to determine which 
avoidance rate to use in the appropriate assessment’.106 Every element of the decision is 
indeed ultimately for the Secretary of State, who however makes that decision largely on the 
basis of the evidence and recommendations provided by the ExA.107 The ExA, 
notwithstanding its approach to the AR, ultimately recommends that the Secretary of State 
can conclude that the integrity of site will not be compromised,108 and that a DCO can be 
granted.109 More straightforwardly, the Secretary of State simply uses the 99% AR, ‘on the 
available evidence, which documents greater avoidance of wind farms by gannets than for 
                                                          
99 [6.7.16]. 
100 [6.7.16]. 
101 Op. cit., n. 3, [88], cited in Hornsea Two [6.7.12]. See also Band, id., [82].  
102 Rampion [5.82]; Hornsea Two [6.7.36].  
103 [5.81]. 
104 [5.104]. 
105 [5.104], [5.131]. 
106 [5.104].  
107 Although the Secretary of State can seek further evidence.  
108 [5.7]. The ExA says on a number of occasions that it is unable to rule out an effect on integrity, but 
the intention is probably to refer to the first stage of the legal process, i.e. that a significant effect 
cannot be ruled out. 
109 The lower (not the upper) threshold is exceeded by only one bird, [5.117], although see the 
Environmental Assessment Report appended to the Letter of the Secretary of State, 16 July 2014, 
suggesting that there needs to be sufficient precautionary headroom to allow for the various 
assumptions and uncertainties required to reach the numbers used, [6.23].  
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many other species’,110 removing any question of ‘too much’ bird mortality. Although it is less 
contested in some subsequent cases,111 the AR is instructive of the ways in which detail 
matters. It is however far from the only contentious assumption. The ‘cumulative impact’ of 
wind farms in various stages of proposal, consent or construction is as pivotal as the AR, 
and as difficult. The table below is slightly adapted112 from the Environmental Assessment 
Report appended to the Secretary of State’s Rampion letter. It indicates both the significance 
of assumptions, and the deceptive simplicity of the ‘output’ of the models. [Table 1 here] 
 
                                                          
110 Secretary of State, id., [23]. See also Environmental Assessment Report, id., especially Table 4 
and [6.22]. 
111 But much discussed in Hornsea Two.  
112 For clarity, largely to avoid fresh acronyms.  
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TABLE 1 
Predicted cumulative gannet and kittiwake adult mortality at the Flamborough Head and Bempton Cliffs SPA. 
 Gannet 98% AR Gannet 99% AR Kittiwake 98% AR 
 
Already consented wind farms adult mortality  
 
199  
 
100  
 
91  
EA One wind farm (with the Secretary of 
State, not yet consented) additional adult 
mortality  
74  37  104  
Rampion adult mortality  14  7  22  
Total  287  144  217  
Lower PBR threshold  286  286  250  
Total adult mortality before Rampion  273  137  195  
Headroom before Rampion (lower PBR)  13  149  55  
Headroom after Rampion (lower PBR)  -1  142  33  
Upper PBR threshold  361  361  350  
Total adult mortality before Rampion  273  137  195  
Headroom before Rampion (upper PBR)  88  224  155  
Headroom after Rampion (upper PBR)  74  217  133  
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We have necessarily simplified the debate that takes place within the process, and its 
reflection in the lengthy ExA reports. But even from this relatively thin outline, the constant 
negotiation is clear, adding to the sense that ‘integrity’ does not exist independently of the 
process, out there waiting to be discovered, but is fundamentally part of that process. 
Discussion and agreement between Natural England and the applicant is a crucial part of 
interpreting and complying with requirements on integrity; we return to Natural England’s role 
below. Interestingly, whether ‘integrity’ might imply something more than bird mortality in the 
particular case113 is not generally subject to discussion in the ExA Reports. This is the first 
and most impenetrable black box in the use of models, and largely comes before the models 
themselves. The prior institutional knowledge implied by listing some sites and not others is 
taken for granted;114 the interesting features (‘conservation objectives’) of these sites is also 
unproblematically incorporated into the reason giving process, as something ‘known’ about 
the world.115 This reliance on prior institutional knowledge is not at all surprising, and allows 
difficult questions to be settled in an earlier process – with obvious benefits and 
disadvantages. The way that this prior institutional knowledge allows the meaning of 
‘integrity’ to be sidestepped is nevertheless intriguing. For the purposes of getting on with a 
decision, ‘integrity’ is boiled down to the ‘viability’ (rather than, for example, flourishing) of the 
particular bird population,116 in turn boiled down to a simple (to describe, not assess) 
question of bird deaths through collision with the turbines. And ways of ‘knowing’ bird deaths 
have been constructed, notwithstanding ‘a dire lack of monitoring evidence, and a high level 
of uncertainty’.117 The ExA reports end up being able to display a table presenting the 
number of predicted bird deaths alongside the number of ‘acceptable’ bird deaths (itself 
presumably determined by reference to an unspoken assumptions about acceptable risks of 
                                                          
113 Conservation objectives for different sites vary.  
114 Op. cit., text at n. 81; see further Lee, op.cit., n. 59.  
115 Which is not to assert a total acquiescence by (especially) local NGOs to the level of protection 
accorded to particular sites and species. Further, in Hornsea Two, areas and species that had not yet 
been made subject to protection were assessed; also RSPB, op. cit., n. 80, challenging the 
interpretation of conservation objectives. 
116 It is possible to construct a legislative line between ‘integrity and ‘viability’, via the definition of 
favourable conservation status (FCS). A species achieves FCS inter alia if the ‘population dynamics 
data on the species concerned indicate that it is maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable 
component of its natural habitats…’, Habitats Directive, op. cit., n. 5, art 2. The conservation status of 
habitats and species are intimately connected, and the FCS of a habitat requires FCS of its typical 
species. FCS pervades the Habitats Directive, but does not appear in the Birds Directive, which refers 
to the maintenance of populations ‘at a level which corresponds in particular to ecological, scientific 
and cultural requirements’, art 2. The Commission reads FCS into the Birds Directive. For a 
fascinating discussion, see Epstein, op. cit., n. 72. Note that in Sustainable Shetland v. The Scottish 
Ministers [2015] Env. L.R. 23 the Supreme Court takes the view that there is nothing in the Directives 
to link FCS with art 2 of the Birds Directive (leaving open article 4 on SPAs), [20].  
117 Hornsea Two [7.3.1].  
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failure). Our intention is not to criticise the lawfulness or broader legitimacy of this approach, 
simply to observe what happens when law demands that decisions be made.  
 
 
AUTHORITY AND CO-PRODUCTION  
 
The discussion above already points towards the co-production of science and law: the 
cognitive techniques, and their outputs, are shaped (even demanded) by law; 
simultaneously, the limits and potential of those cognitive techniques shape what law means 
and demands. We also see the beginning of a similar phenomenon in terms of authority, 
which we explore further in this section. How and what we know is tightly linked with who 
governs and how, with epistemic and legal authority mutually reinforcing each other.118 
Emma Lees’ insightful discussion of decision making on European sites discusses a 
‘triumvirate’ of ‘decision-makers’, composed of the judiciary, scientific advisors and 
administrative bodies, with authority depending on whether the nature of the decision is 
identified as being a question of law, fact or judgment respectively (although neither she nor 
we suggest that these terms can be neatly separated).119 Whether ‘integrity’ is a matter of 
law, fact, or value judgment is a difficult question to answer satisfactorily, and that has 
important substantive implications for who makes decisions, and how.  
 
In addition to the judiciary, key actors in the NSIP process include the Secretary of State, the 
ExA, Natural England and the applicant. The Secretary of State is the equivalent of Lees’ 
‘administrative authority’, a role that, given the strength of the ExA’s advice, is shared. 
Although the Secretary of State remains responsible, he or she is highly dependent on the 
quality of the work done by the ExA. The primary ‘scientific’ advisor in respect of nature 
conservation is Natural England, who advises both the ExA and the Secretary of State, 
although of course value judgments pervade these technical exercises. The NSIP process 
also includes public participation. As discussed below, specialist nature conservation NGOs 
engage vigorously in some cases, although they find it difficult to have a decisive impact on 
the decision.  
 
Natural England clearly plays a very influential role in the specific decision on ‘integrity’, and 
the ways in which models are used in that decision. As a statutory body, constituted 
                                                          
118 M. Weimer and A. de Ruijter, op. cit., n. 6, most explicitly in the editors’ introduction; C. Waterton 
and B. Wynne, ‘Knowledge and Political Power in the European Environment Agency’ in Jasanoff, op. 
cit., n. 4; Irwin, op. cit., n. 19.  
119 E. Lees, ‘Allocation of Decision-Making Power under the Habitats Directive’ (2016) 28 J. of 
Environmental Law 191.  
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amongst other things to provide advice to public authorities on nature conservation and 
biodiversity, it enjoys a certain institutional authority.120 The influence of Natural England is 
partly attributable to the ExA’s strong preference for agreement between Natural England 
and the applicant. The applicant is required to consult Natural England prior to making its 
application for a DCO,121 and the Planning Inspectorate advises the applicant to confirm 
‘where appropriate’ in the application that Natural England ‘supports the conclusions’,122 and 
to seek Statements of Common Ground with Natural England.123 It would be hard to 
overestimate the importance of agreement between the applicant and Natural England, in 
narrowing the scope of debate and resolving specific issues.124  
 
But even when Natural England and the applicant do not agree, the role of the statutory 
nature conservation body remains a strong one.125 The High Court in the Welsh onshore 
wind farm case of Mynydd y Gwynt, citing earlier case law throughout, found that the 
Secretary of State ‘was bound to give considerable weight’ to the advice of Natural 
Resources Wales that an onshore nationally significant wind farm was ‘likely to have a 
significant effect’ on a European site, ‘unless there was good reason not to do so’.126 Given 
the Secretary of State’s ‘wide discretion in the matter’, she was, further, ‘clearly entitled to 
follow that advice, even if others (e.g. the ExA) disagreed’.127 The Supreme Court decision in 
Morge is also striking: ‘Where … Natural England express themselves satisfied that a 
                                                          
120 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006.  
121 Planning Act 2008, s. 42(a); The Infrastructure Planning (Applications: Prescribed Forms and 
Procedures) Regulations 2009 SI 2009/2264.  
122 Planning Inspectorate, Advice Note 10: Habitats Regulations Assessment relevant to Nationally 
Significant Infrastructure Projects (2013), 7.  
123 Id. 8. 
124 See further Y. Rydin et al., ‘Black-boxing the Evidence: Planning Regulation and Major Renewable 
Energy Infrastructure Projects in England and Wales’ Planning Theory and Practice, forthcoming. 
These agreements do not formally prevent the ExA hearing disagreement, but they are highly 
influential.  
125 Which is not to say that the ExA never disagrees with Natural England. E.g. in Hornsea One, the 
ExA disagrees with Natural England’s conclusion on integrity, inter alia because its ‘rigid’ approach to 
the AR ‘is considered over-precautionary’ [5.109].  
126 [67(xi)]. See also Smyth v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] Env. 
L. R. 7, [81]; R (on the application of Akester) v. Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
[2010] Env. L.R. 33, [112]. 
127 [67(xi)], emphasis added. The Secretary of State faced a difference of opinion between its two 
advisors, the specialist nature conservation advisor and the specialist planner; she followed the 
advice of Natural Resources Wales, and the High Court upheld her decision. Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v. Downs [2010] Env. L.R. 7 is perhaps the leading 
environmental case on conflicting advice. The legislative context is always significant, but in Downs, a 
deferential standard of review is applied to the Secretary of State’s decision, so that as long as the 
choice was Wednesbury reasonable, the Court shall not interfere. R (Mott) v. Environment Agency 
[2016] 1 W.L.R. 4338 is slightly different, focusing on the standard of judicial review of Environment 
Agency decision making (rather than the influence of Agency advice on another body’s evaluation), 
but emphasises the difficulty of concluding that a prediction, based on expertise and experience plus 
the balancing of interests, is irrational.  
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proposed development will be compliant … the planning authority are to my mind entitled to 
presume that that is so’.128 The legal framework in Morge is importantly different from the 
Planning Act, since the planning authority was not required to make its own assessment, 
simply to ‘have regard’ to the relevant legal provisions. The Secretary of State in our cases 
clearly is required to decide for herself. Morge speaks nevertheless to the scientific authority 
of Natural England. The influence of Natural England and Natural Resources Wales is more 
generally implicit in the emphasis by the judiciary on the external authority provided by 
science. According to the Court of Justice, the assessment must be based on ‘the best 
scientific evidence in the field’;129 ‘complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions 
capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt’.130  
 
The strong place for Natural England in decision making on offshore wind farms reinforces 
the ‘scientific’, ‘factual’ presentation of the integrity question, just as that scientific 
understanding reinforces the authority of Natural England. The legal obligation in the 
Habitats Regulations is however to ‘have regard’ to Natural England’s advice, not 
necessarily to follow it. This leaves clear space for evaluation by the ExA and the Secretary 
of State, and the Courts are careful to avoid giving expert advisors the final say. The Court of 
Appeal has confirmed that ‘the views of Natural England may – though not must – be given 
considerable weight’ in habitats cases.131 A court will look behind the expert evidence, and in 
one extreme case, when Natural England’s advice ‘could not be supported on logical and 
empirical grounds’, the decision relying on it was unreasonable in Wednesbury terms.132 But 
more importantly than identifying error, asserting the authority of the final decision maker is 
about asserting that the nature of the decision is not (could never be) wholly scientific. The 
decision ‘clearly requires evaluative judgments to be made’;133 and the task of ‘judging what 
is an “acceptable” level of risk’ is ‘an eminently political responsibility’.134  
 
                                                          
128 Op. cit., n. 73, [30]. R (on the application of Devon Wildlife Trust) v. Teignbridge District Council 
[2015] EWHC 2159 (Admin), ‘Natural England’s opinion should properly be given particular weight’, 
[78(c)(viii)]. 
129 Waddenzee, op. cit., n. 46, [54]. 
130 Sweetman, op. cit., n. 63, [44]; also Lees, op. cit., n. 119. Since that article was written, see also 
Mynydd y Gwynt, op. cit., n. 47; R (On the application of DLA Delivery Ltd) v. Lewes District Council 
[2017] Env. L.R. 18.  
131 DLA, id., [30]. This might simply be more careful wording than the cases in the previous note.  
132 Wealden District Council v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] 
EWHC 351, [101]. ClientEarth v. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2016] EWHC 
2740 (Admin); [2017] Env LR 16 indicates that the courts are willing to look behind the ‘markedly 
optimistic’ assumptions made in air pollution modelling, in an extreme situation where it was 
acknowledged that ‘”emerging data” were undermining the models’, [86] and [85]. Also Smyth, op. cit., 
n. 126, [83].  
133 Smyth, id., [78], citing AG Kokott in Waddenzee, op. cit., n. 46.  
134 Smyth id., [100]. Also Waddnezee, id. 
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The inability to sustain tidy lines between these different categories is however at the heart 
of the critique posed by co-production. The vanishing line between fact and value is familiar 
in legal scholarship, and their mutual shaping often acknowledged. The space for law is 
equally important to the construction of evidence, and to the determination of where authority 
lies. It is clear that the legal meaning of integrity ‘cannot be understood without engagement 
with the facts’.135 Integrity is defined in part through the prior institutional knowledge 
contained in the conservation objectives – but nor are they self-executing.136 Integrity is, for 
a particular site, defined in the process of governing. The important insights of ‘co-
production’, that social and natural worlds are mutually constitutive, applies also to law: the 
facts are partially legally constructed, and law does not exist independently of and prior to 
the facts. ‘Mixed’ questions of fact and law are a routine feature of law,137 but are especially 
challenging here. Law demands the governance of ‘integrity’; collision risk modelling renders 
bird populations, and in turn integrity, ostensibly governable. The collision risk models fill out 
the ‘institutional mandate’138 of integrity, in this case both describing as well as applying the 
institutional mandate.  
 
It is not easy to pull the nature of the decision or the associated allocation of authority 
cleanly out of the cases. ‘Integrity’ is a legal term, with a legal meaning and legal 
implications; but it is also a mixed question of fact and evaluation. Holders of all of those 
different types of authority exercise power within the process, but in a mutually dependent 
way. Courts interfere with findings of fact, judgment and law very differently, so that 
contentious exercises of line drawing could be normatively meaningful. The collision risk 
modelling, a cognitive technique fortified by legal requirements, does not just provide an 
output, to be fed into a decision. It provides a process for constructing legal meaning and 
legal compliance, avoiding in most cases hard questions of who has authority. In the 
process, the models provide legal authority to the applicant’s proposal, through evidence 
sufficient to satisfy legal tests constructed within the process of governing. This is the subject 
of the next section.  
                                                          
135 Lees, op. cit., n. 119.  
136 Text at op. cit., n. 80. 
137 See e.g. T. Endicott, ‘Questions of Law’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Rev. 292. Indeed this seems a 
very apposite description of the legally ubiquitous ‘reasonable person’. Whether the ‘reasonable 
person’ standard has been complied with is purportedly a question of fact, subject to spare legal 
definition, but the finding is clearly normative. By contrast with integrity, the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
reasonable person is self-consciously accessible to (often dependent on) lay judgment, and both fact 
and law are determined by the private law judge. When the activities of the reasonable person 
become more exotic and less accessible to common sense (e.g. the reasonableness of medical 
treatment), fact finding becomes more complicated (see also M. Lee, ‘The Sources and Challenges of 
Norm Generation in Tort Law’ European Journal of Risk Regulation forthcoming). In our case of 
administrative decision making, there are greater challenges for specifying authority. 
138 Fisher et al., op. cit., n. 7.  
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UNCERTAINTY, PROCESS, AND THE ROLE OF COLLISION RISK MODELLING  
 
Co-production of fact and law, as in the previous section, is an important part of the puzzle 
here, contributing both to the definition and identification of integrity in any particular case, 
and to the sharing and assigning of authority between different actors. Collision risk models 
are part of making practical progress notwithstanding the challenges; of allowing everyone to 
step through hard to sustain distinctions. Profound uncertainty pervades discussion of the 
impact of offshore wind farms on ecosystems and birds, and is perhaps inherent to such a 
densely co-produced knowledge. More data (for example on how well birds avoid wind 
turbine blades) or better models, will only reduce, not eliminate, the uncertainty. When the 
factual predictions are less uncertain (including for onshore wind farms, where researchers 
have had the advantage of being able to collect and count dead birds), this whole story will 
be less dramatic. But in our cases, the NSIP process becomes primarily a space for making 
decisions in conditions of uncertainty. In this context, it is as important to interrogate the 
models for their contribution to process values as for their contribution to questions of fact.  
 
The models discussed here are not naively regarded as ‘truth machines’,139 and the 
‘spurious level of precision’140 that they provide seems not to be taken unduly literally by 
Natural England or the ExA (or possibly even by the applicant, whose approach is being 
criticised in this quotation). This seems fairly apparent from the general discussion, and for 
example from the occasional appearance of fractions of a bird.141 In Rampion, the outputs of 
the model are described as ‘predicted mortalities’,142 but in Hornsea Two, possibly more 
accurately, as ‘collision risk estimates’.143 More directly, in an interesting piece of boundary 
work,144 the applicant in Rampion argues that disagreement on ARs (and as discussed 
above, ARs feed directly into the ‘answer’) is not a ‘scientifically based’ uncertainty, but a 
policy uncertainty, arising out of ‘the absence of [a] clear policy view’.145 Natural England 
apparently concurred to at least some degree, stating that ‘in the absence of strategic 
guidance’, the inability to agree ARs ‘is likely to remain a difference in professional opinion 
                                                          
139 Fisher et al., id.  
140 Hornsea Two, bird flight-height data [5.57].  
141 See e.g. Rampion’s Report on Impact on European Sites.  
142 Eg [5.79], table 5.2. 
143 Eg [6.7.41].  
144 Irwin, op. cit. n. 19. 
145 [5.5].  
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and a matter not agreed’.146 Instrumentally, the insistence that ‘lack of certainty [derives] 
from matters other than those which are scientific’147 avoids triggering Waddenzee 
precaution (which we might call ‘factual’ precaution).148 But it is based on an understanding 
that judgment of how many birds will be killed by turbine blades is not purely factual.  
 
Nor are the courts naïve about the elusiveness of straightforward facts in respect of habitats 
protection. Even in Waddenzee, that most demanding case, AG Kokott acknowledges that a 
decision maker might be ‘subjectively’ certain, even when certainty ‘from an objective point 
of view’ is impossible.149 She also acknowledges that ‘if no certainty can be established even 
having exhausted all scientific means and sources, it will consequently be necessary also to 
work with probabilities and estimates. They must be identified and reasoned’.150  
 
The inability of the models to provide truth (about bird deaths, about integrity) should be 
uninteresting, especially if recognised by those within the process. ‘Proof’ is rarely 
available,151 and incomplete information is absolutely routine in planning and conservation. 
Administrative bodies habitually turn to different cognitive techniques, including modelling, 
for a ‘good enough’ solution.152  
 
The ExA in our cases does not engage in an unrealistic search for ‘truth pure and simple’ 
(the decision in Waddenzee notwithstanding), but ‘serviceable truth’.153 Serviceable truth is a 
‘state of knowledge that satisfies tests of scientific acceptability and supports reasoned 
decision making, but also assures those exposed to risk that their interests have not been 
sacrificed on the altar of an impossible scientific certainty’.154 Not only are facts that are 
‘good enough’ for the purpose of governance shaped and created within the examination, in 
debate and agreement, but so is what good enough means. The need to take a decision 
within especially strict time limits (six months for the examination) contributes to the 
construction of the meaning of good enough,155 as does the highly precautionary legal 
                                                          
146 [5.59].See also the discussion of the need for an authoritative resolution of the cumulative issue, 
[5.124]-[5.126].  
147 [5.5].  
148 Waddenzee, op. cit., n. 46.  
149 Id., [107]. 
150 Id., [97]. 
151 N. Oreskes, ‘Science and Public Policy: What’s Proof Got to do With it?’ (2004) 7 Environmental 
Science and Policy 369. 
152 E.g. R.L. Glicksman, ‘Bridging Data Gaps through Modelling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of 
Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity under the National Forest Management Act’ 
(2008) 83 Indiana Law J. 465.  
153 Jasanoff, op. cit., n. 8, p. 1725.  
154 S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (1990) 250. 
155 Owen and Fine, op. cit., n.7, p. 155, in respect of air pollution modelling.  
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context provided by the Habitats Directive. Although uncertainty is recognised in cases like 
Waddenzee, it is little tolerated, rendering ideas of ‘merely’ serviceable truth especially 
tricky. Doubt is supposed to be resolved by rejecting the application for development, 
although the question immediately becomes, again, working out what doubt means in the 
particular case. This may be one of those areas where law is ‘doing the impossible, knowing 
full well that it is impossible’.156  
 
Acceptance that models do not reveal the world is not to say that the quality of the models is 
irrelevant. 157 A model that said either that no birds will avoid the wind farm, or that they all 
will, is less rigorous than a model estimating how many will do so, an estimation that may be 
refined over time by observation. The energy devoted to arguing about the models reminds 
us both that what constitutes ‘good enough’ knowledge is contentious, and that the 
substance of the models matters. The model needs to ‘credibly pass as objective in a 
particular context, for certain purposes, and only for now’, not for all purposes and all time.158  
 
What Andrew Lang calls ‘“as if” knowledge practices’ is also a useful way of working through 
the role of the models in decision making in our cases. ‘As if’ knowledge practices have ‘very 
little aspiration to facticity: they do not seek to accurately represent the world, but rather to 
offer themselves as a tool for action within it’.159 This suggests that we should assess our 
models not in terms of the certainty or accuracy of their outcomes, but in terms of their 
contribution to the task of legitimate governance. Lang examines the role of the ‘market’ as a 
benchmark of legitimacy in the global regulation of subsidies, and argues that in this context, 
the ‘market’ is not a factual (economic), but a legal, construct. Taking a legal approach to the 
‘market’ enables decision makers to ‘cut short debates about the adequacy and accuracy of 
economic expertise, by reference to an alternative set of techniques, and criteria of validity, 
and through the production of legal fictions’.160 Lang’s markets are a matter of law, effortfully 
resisting a ‘factual’ determination. ‘Integrity’ may share a certain non-facticity with Lang’s 
markets. We do begin with a legal construct (integrity) rather than a question that even 
purports to exist out there in the world (integrity?). And yet, as discussed above, the courts 
insist on the scientific content of integrity, suggesting at least a factual element. Moreover, 
                                                          
156 Knop et al., op. cit., n. 10 , at 645 (of conflicts of law).  
157 N. Oreskes, ‘Evaluation (not Validation) of Quantitative Models’ (1998) 106 Environmental Health 
Perspectives 1453; Fisher et al., op. cit., n. 7. See e.g. Hornsea Two: ‘Notwithstanding the 
uncertainties and complexities involved in the predictive modelling … the Panel wishes to 
acknowledge the considerable value to its Examination of the efforts and outputs which were devoted 
to several rounds of the task to further refine and clarify offshore ornithological issues’ [6.7.8].  
158 A. Lang, ‘New Legal Realism, Empiricism, and Scientism: the Relative Objectivity of Law and 
Social Science’ (2015) 28 Leiden J. of International Law 231, at 254.  
159 Id.166. 
160 Id. 150.  
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once we have decided that birds are what matter, ‘birds’ and ‘markets’ are very different 
things. Adding to the complexity, ‘as if’ reasoning is closely related to the notion of the ‘legal 
fiction’,161 which is generally thought to apply to ‘questions of fact’ rather than ‘questions of 
law’,162 or perhaps ‘a legal conclusion … that takes the form of a factual statement’.163 A 
lengthy digression on whether we are dealing with legal fictions in our cases would not really 
advance our reasoning very far. But this fluidity of fact and law is perhaps appropriate where 
law and fact are, as discussed in the previous section, as densely co-produced as they are 
here. The ‘fiction’, if there is one, is in speaking ‘as if’ we ‘know’, both what integrity means 
and whether it will be adversely affected by the proposed development. This extends fiction 
very far into legal reasoning.  
 
This idea of ‘as if’ reasoning resonates very strongly with the discussion of integrity in the 
reports. No one needs to believe that the ExA’s conclusions on bird mortality and the 
integrity of protected sites literally reflect the state of the world, or that when they do not 
come to pass, an error must have been made. But they allow a decision to be made. 
Perhaps paradoxically, whilst not ‘truth machines’, models may (eventually, after 
contestation and iteration) be seen as ‘answer machines’,164 providing a single answer to the 
legal question. Rather than ‘acting on our belief’, the models determine ‘our actions’,165 in 
this particular context, as if they are able to answer the question about integrity. This is 
especially the case if the model methodology or output has been agreed between the 
applicant and Natural England, as a sufficient basis for action. The ExA Reports, whilst 
acknowledging uncertainty, proceed to a resolution as if they know how many birds will die, 
and what the implications of that are. Uncertainty and disagreement are simply folded into 
the reasoning.  
 
 ‘Good enough’ and ‘as if’ modes of decision making are quite different in some respects, 
particularly in the sense that one seeks to approximate the ‘truth’, whilst the other ‘wilfully 
abandons it’.166 But they are clearly related, and like ‘as if’ reasoning, ‘serviceable truth’ is 
primarily interested in the purpose of fact finding.167 In neither case is the process fixated on 
discovering truth, but on reaching legitimate, more or less acceptable, decisions for the 
                                                          
161 There is a long history. See eg L.L. Fuller, ‘Legal Fictions’ (1930) 25 Illinois Law Rev. 363 and 513.  
162 K. Campbell, ‘Fuller on Legal Fictions’ (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 339.  
163 A. Riles, ‘Is the Law Hopeful?’ Cornell Law Faculty Working Paper 1-1-2010, pp. 15-16. See also 
op. cit., n.137.  
164 Wagner et al., op. cit., n. 2, although note that answer machines and truth machines may be more 
or less synonymous for their purposes.  
165 Lang, op. cit., n. 9. 
166 Knop et al., op. cit., n. 10.  
167 Jasanoff, op. cit., n. 8, p. 1725. 
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immediate purpose of governing. And they can occupy the same ground: both resonate with 
our reading of the ExA reports. The striving for better data speaks to ‘serviceable truth’, as 
does the apparent confidence of the courts in the ability of science to provide the answer. 
The silence on the meanings at stake in integrity, and the pervasive complexity of deciding, 
speaks to the latter. Lang also acknowledges that the ‘functionalist’ mode, where law 
‘borrows’ objectivity from an external perspective can coexist with the transformation of bird 
deaths into a legal (rather than factual) concept; or for our purposes a co-produced concept, 
not neatly legal, factual or evaluative.  
 
In any event, we move away from seeing the models as simply, or primarily: true or false; 
right or wrong.168 Instead, we focus on ‘the practical necessity of arriving at a resolution’,169 
and how the models assist with that. It would be an overstatement to describe the approach 
to collision risk modelling that we have seen in the Examinations as deliberative, but the 
opportunity for negotiation and collaboration, at least between certain privileged parties, is 
significant.170 The models provide artefacts around which discussion can orient itself, 
‘apertures’ for ‘learning’.171 The iteration of the models in communication between the 
various parties is a constant theme of the ExA reports. The applicant and Natural England 
are negotiating the best lawful way to think about the impact of wind farms on birds, in the 
context of considerable time constraints. The ExA plays an active role in that, and the 
Secretary of State’s oversight can be active and disruptive (as demonstrated by Mynydd y 
Gwynt). Specialist NGOs contribute energetically, and may be partially successful in framing 
the debate. The RSPB was profoundly engaged in Hornsea Two, for example, and clearly 
contributed to the shaping of the evidence. But whilst ‘differences between Natural England 
and the Applicant … did narrow’ during the examination, ‘[the] narrowing in differences was 
much less between the positions of the Applicant and the RSPB’.172 Ultimately, the RSPB’s 
conclusion that there would be an adverse effect on the integrity of European sites was 
rejected by the ExA, which preferred the agreement between the applicant and Natural 
England.  
 
                                                          
168 Avoiding ‘strategic games’ between parties (Wagner, et al., op. cit., n. 2), or constant efforts to 
‘deconstruct each other’s positions instead of deliberating effectively’ S. Jasanoff, ‘Technologies of 
humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science’ (2003) 41 Minerva 223, at 237).  
169 D. Sarewitz, ‘How Science Makes Environmental Controversy Worse’ (2004) 7 Environmental 
Science and Policy 385 – although we do not need to go so far as he does, in the very different 
context of the disputed Gore / Bush election results.  
170 Fisher et al., op. cit., n. 7, discuss ‘regulatory strategy’ models, ‘tools for networking public and 
private actors into collaborative decision-making’ and a ‘vehicle for collaborative deliberation’, p. 256.  
171 S. Owens et al., ‘New Agendas for Appraisal: Reflection on Theory, Practice, and Research (2004) 
36 Environment and Planning A 1943, at 1950. Fisher et al., id.  
172 [6.6.3] Also Hornsea One [5.28]. 
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The question becomes how or whether the models (or any other techniques) contribute to 
the task of legitimate governance of a phenomenon we do not (and for now at least cannot) 
really understand. Legitimacy is a complex idea, and the subject of an enormous 
literature.173 But fundamentally, and sufficiently for current purposes, legitimacy is concerned 
with the acceptability of the substance, the legality and the process of a decision, to the 
various communities (lay and professional) involved. We are not suggesting that legitimacy 
requires everyone to be happy; and that is far from the case in the decisions we have 
examined.174 But the modelling contributes to the hard work of constructing the legitimacy of 
some aspects of these decisions:175 an approximation to the facts contributes to epistemic 
legitimacy;176 the space for negotiation potentially contributes both to process legitimacy and 
to approximating the facts; and in a framework of co-production, the entire exercise allows 
for formal legal requirements to be satisfied. 
 
If we see models as contributing to the legitimacy of a process for decision making, the 
sufficiency of representation in our cases raises enough questions for at least another 
article.177 The lay public is notable by its absence in the discussion of birds, presumably in 
part precisely because of the highly technical nature of the discussion. Diverse forms of 
highly localised, less formal expertise, such as that found in bird watching groups may also 
be sidelined from the crucial discussions around the modelling.178 Taking part in the intense 
six month process of constantly evolving evidence that constitutes an Examination is 
onerous.179 Alongside these practical and epistemic challenges, the difficulty of unearthing 
and challenging assumptions embedded in the output is a perennial barrier to inclusive 
processes around technical methods. Some assumptions in our cases are very ‘visible’, 
including for example the Rampion ARs. But in later cases, the 99% AR used by developers 
is accepted by Natural England, and the ExA, citing a review of the evidence prepared for 
                                                          
173 See the analysis of the literature in J. Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and 
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137.  
174 L. Natarajan et al, ‘Navigating the participatory processes of renewable energy infrastructure 
regulation: A ‘local participant perspective’ on the NSIPs regime in England and Wales’ (2018) 114 
Energy Policy 201. 
175 Black op.cit., n. 173.  
176 Jasanoff, op. cit., n. 8, p. 1723.  
177 Wagner et al., op. cit., n. 2.  
178 See e.g. the disagreement around the exclusion of the local expertise of members of the 
Christchurch Harbour Ornithological Group in Navitus, [20.4.4]-[20.4.8]. But note the inclusion of 
evidence from a range of participants.  
179 Y. Rydin et al., ‘Local Voices on Renewable Energy Projects: The Performative Role of the 
Regulatory Process for Major Offshore Infrastructure in England and Wales’ Local Environment 
forthcoming.  
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Marine Scotland Science.180 That crucial assumption could easily ‘[fall] out of sight’.181 We 
might also note that the energy devoted to birds, the detailed and lengthy discussion, whilst 
easily explicable in legal terms, is striking when set alongside the relative lack of concern 
spontaneously expressed by local people for birds.182  
 
This article is not primarily about participation in the NSIPs process, although we do discuss 
these issues elsewhere.183 Our intention here is to observe the work that the collision risk 
models are doing in the ExA’s reasoning, and in the processes around that reasoning. 
Models are not simple mirrors to the world. But their discussion, negotiation and iteration is a 
significant element of the Examination, and intense if not inclusive. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although patently unable to reveal the ‘truth’ about integrity, in moreover a legal context that 
is exceptionally intolerant of uncertainty, collision risk modelling has become an important 
part of the process for consenting novel infrastructure. Models provide a space within which 
‘good enough’ evidence can be negotiated, and a pragmatic tool that allows for regulatory 
action to be taken. They are also part of the co-production of law and knowledge, and of the 
authority associated with law and knowledge, and that co-production is a significant feature 
of the determination of integrity in our cases. The legal framework seems to demand 
knowledge that is frankly unattainable. But the legal meaning of ‘integrity’ is no more a ‘fact’ 
out there waiting to be discovered than the impact of a wind farm on the integrity of a 
European site. What integrity means, and what knowledge the legal framework demands, 
are each partially constituted during the process of decision making. Jasanoff argues that 
co-production, the ‘deep entanglement of knowledge, materiality and norms’ is most visible 
at times of change, ‘at times of emergence, contestation, standardisation and importation of 
ideas from one source into other contexts … the “new natural” [gets] built into core elements 
of social order’.184 Both the Planning Act and innovative large offshore wind farms create 
new sets of institutional arrangements and institutional demands. This allow us to see the 
                                                          
180 Cook et al., op. cit., n. 13, describing the AR as a ‘fudge factor’ within the models, p. 7. Natural 
England do not always accept the ARs in this paper without reflection, see e.g. Hornsea Two, 
[6.7.35].  
181 P. Pascual et al., ‘Making Method Visible: Improving the Quality of Science-Based Regulation’ 
(2013) 2 Mich J. Envtl & Admin L 429, at 432. In Navitus Bay, not only was the 99% AR adopted, but 
predicted bird deaths from other wind farms were updated with a 99% AR for the ‘cumulative’ 
assessment.  
182 M. Aitken et al., ‘Locating “Power” in Wind Power Planning Processes: The (Not So) Influential 
Role of Local Objectors’ (2008) 51 J. of Environmental Planning and Management 777.  
183 See e.g. op. cit., nn. 11 and 179.  
184 Jasanoff, op. cit., n. 17, p. 23. 
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complex processes of co-production in even apparently banal regulatory settings, and how 
they allow for the governance of large wind farms in our marine environment.   
 
As indicated in the introduction, the purpose of this article is not to critique the models. A 
critique of the models would explore their social embeddedness, their contingency and 
obfuscation. It would highlight the profound uncertainty that remains after their absorption 
into the decision, and may even challenge the legality of the decisions. Such critiques can be 
valuable and important. The co-production lens used here, however, offers a different 
perspective on regulation, allowing us to ask a different set of questions about the role the 
models play in our story, and to focus on how we govern. 
 
 
 
 
